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Fifteen years ago, in Payne v. Tennessee,1 the Supreme Court
lifted its prohibition on the admission of victim impact evi-
dence (VIE) in the penalty phase of capital trials. According
to the Court, admitting evidence on the personal traits of
individual murder victims and the toll associated with their
killings at once properly allowed the government to show
the “uniqueness” of victims, thus counterbalancing defen-
dants’ largely unfettered right to adduce mitigation
evidence, and permitted the sentencing authority to under-
stand the “specific harm” caused by the murder.2
In the wake of Payne, Congress authorized use of VIE
as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, and VIE has become
a staple in federal death penalty trials,3 including those of
Timothy McVeigh and Zacarias Moussaoui. Despite this
prominence, to date no study has been undertaken of VIE
in federal capital trials in particular. In this article, I do so,
analyzing all federal decisions in the Westlaw database
containing victim impact–related claims rendered since
Payne, as well as the statutory and case law concerning
admission of VIE. 
I. Payne and the FDPA
In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court reversed its prior
holdings of only a few years before in Booth v. Maryland4
and South Carolina v. Gathers5 and concluded that the
Eighth Amendment posed no per se bar to the admission
of VIE in capital trials. In the penalty phase of Payne’s
death penalty prosecution for the killings of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter Lacie Jo, the
prosecution adduced testimony of Ms. Christopher’s
mother, who related how her grandson Nicholas, who him-
self had been stabbed and witnessed the gruesome events,
had been emotionally affected by the killings.6 In addition,
in his closing arguments to the jury the prosecutor elabo-
rated on the grandmother’s testimony, offering that 
[n]o one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she
never had the chance to grow up. . . . [Nicholas’s]
mother will never kiss him goodnight or pat him as he
goes off to bed, or hold him and sing a lullaby. [Peti-
tioner’s attorney] wants you to think about . . . people
who love the defendant and things about him. He
doesn’t want you to think about the people who loved
F E D E R A L  S E N T E N C I N G  R E P O RT E R • VO L . 1 9 , N O. 1 • O C TO B E R  2 0 0 6 5
Charisse Christopher . . . The people who loved little
Lacie Jo . . . The brother who mourns for her every sin-
gle day and wants to know where his best little
playmate is. He doesn’t have anybody to watch car-
toons with him, a little one. These are the things
that . . . that child will carry forever.7
In a 6-3 decision, the Court rejected Payne’s contention
that the VIE admitted in his trial violated the Eighth
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist first disputed the premise of Booth and Gathers that
“evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm that
a capital defendant causes a victim’s family” is immaterial
to capital sentencing outcomes.8 Rather, harm tradition-
ally has served as a factor in assessing blameworthiness in
punishment decisions; although “this particular evi-
dence—designed to portray for the sentencing authority
the actual harm caused by a particular crime—is of recent
origin, this fact hardly renders it unconstitutional.”9
According to the Chief Justice, “[v]ictim impact evidence is
simply another form or method of informing the sentenc-
ing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime
in question, evidence of a general type long considered by
sentencing authorities.”10
Second, precluding VIE “unfairly weighted the scales
in a capital trial,”11 insofar as it “deprive[d] the State of the
full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury
from having before it all the information necessary to
determine the proper punishment for a first-degree mur-
der.”12 In order to “‘keep the balance true’” in capital
trials,13 the government cannot be constitutionally barred
from offering a “‘quick glimpse of the life’ which a defen-
dant ‘chose to extinguish’”14 and demonstrating the loss
associated therewith.15
In rescinding its categorical prohibition, the Court
imposed a case-by-case, due process–based admissibility
standard requiring that VIE be barred only when it “is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair.”16 Furthermore, the Court left intact its holding in
Booth that “a victim’s family members’ characterizations
and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence” are still barred by the Eighth
Amendment.17
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Even though Payne refrained from affirmatively
endorsing use of VIE,18 the typically highly emotional
form of evidence has proved enormously popular.19 As
part of its expansion of death-eligible crimes in the Fed-
eral Death Penalty Act of 1994,20 Congress expressly
approved of VIE in capital trials.21 Section 3593(a) of the
FDPA provides that aggravating evidence “may include
factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim
and the victim’s family,”22 adding that such evidence may
include “oral testimony, a victim impact statement that
identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and
scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the
victim’s family, and any other relevant information.”23
In the event the sentencing authority unanimously
finds that the government has established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory
aggravating factor,24 VIE, a nonstatutory aggravator,25 can
be considered in capital decisions, presuming adequate
prior notice of intent to admit VIE is provided.26 Unlike
their state court counterparts,27 federal courts with some
frequency have required rather detailed notice of VIE that
the government proposes to use.28 In granting a defense
motion to amend a death notice, for instance, the North-
ern District of Indiana held that the government must
indicate “who will offer victim impact evidence, the rela-
tion the witness is to the victim, the form of testimony
(i.e., written or oral statement) and a summary of the
anticipated testimony.”29 At the same time, however, fed-
eral courts have refrained from requiring that the actual
VIE of witnesses be submitted in written form for the
court’s preliminary review and have refused to restrict VIE
ultimately presented by witnesses to such testimony.30
Federal trial courts have at times also evinced concern
over the unique nature of VIE and adopted special proce-
dures. In particular, citing concern over the anticipated
prejudicial nature of VIE, three federal courts have
required a bifurcated sentencing proceeding in which VIE
is to be heard only after the jury determines the threshold
mens rea and statutory aggravating factor requirements.31
II. VIE in the Federal System
Payne and the FDPA plainly allow for the consideration of
VIE in the sentencing phase of capital trials, yet they pro-
vide only the most generalized guidance on its
admissibility and use. For its part, the FDPA, while not
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence,32 requires that
trial courts ensure that the probative value of evidence
(including VIE) is not outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice.33 The sole constitutional limit prescribed by
Payne, sounding in due process, is that any VIE admitted
not be “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fun-
damentally unfair.”34 In imposing the case-by-case analytic
framework in lieu of Booth’s Eighth Amendment per se
bar against VIE, Payne (the concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Souter and O’Connor in particular)35 expressed faith
that trial and appellate courts would vigorously police
admission of VIE. 
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This expectation, however, has not translated into suc-
cessful challenges to VIE. Despite qualifying as what
Judge Richard Matsch, presiding judge in the Timothy
McVeigh capital trial, called “the most problematical of all
the aggravating factors [which] may present the greatest
difficulty in determining the nature and scope of the infor-
mation to be presented,”36 VIE has proved notably
resistant to successful challenge. During the fifteen years
since Payne, while trial courts have at times acceded to
defense requests to regulate the procedures pertaining to
the admission of VIE,37 and on occasion more substantive
matters,38 not a single appellate court has overturned a
death verdict as a result of impermissible VIE.39
Federal appellate courts either reject claims outright or,
employing Payne’s due process standard, find that that the
VIE was not “so unduly prejudicial that it render[ed] the
trial fundamentally unfair.”40 In applying the open-ended
test, courts often resort to a highly relativistic inquiry,
weighing the VIE against the heinousness of the crime41
or the relative amount of trial time dedicated to the VIE,
with many courts actually counting the number of tran-
script pages compared to other aggravating as well as
mitigating evidence.42 The Fourth Circuit, for instance,
while noting that the VIE presented had “substantial
impact,” and even conceding arguendo that it exceeded the
“quick glimpse” authorized by Payne, concluded in United
States v. Barnette that in relative terms the VIE did not
“contaminate” the sentencing proceeding as a whole.43
Meanwhile, in the subsequent decision United States v.
Stitt,44 another Fourth Circuit panel used the same
approach in what it denominated as harmless error analy-
sis to condone the government’s violation of the statutory
notice requirement.45
The following provides an overview of the substantive
shape, form, and extent of VIE used today in federal capi-
tal trials. 
A. Background and Number of VIE Witnesses 
The FDPA fails to provide limiting criteria on either the
identity or the number of persons qualified to testify, free-
ing federal courts to liberally admit VIE. This
expansiveness was most apparent in the trials of Timothy
McVeigh and Zacarias Moussaoui. In McVeigh, the gov-
ernment presented thirty-eight VIE witnesses, including
twenty-six survivors of deceased victims, three persons
injured, one employee of the day care center in the
bombed Murrah Federal Building, and eight rescue and
medical workers.46 While noting that the witnesses were
“significant in number,” the Tenth Circuit lauded the gov-
ernment’s “self-restraint”47 and observed that the volume
“comprised an extremely small percentage of the number
of potential witnesses the government might have called
to testify about the 168 victims who died in the blast and
the impact of the explosion on the numerous injured vic-
tims.”48 According to the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he sheer
number of actual victims and the horrific things done to
them necessarily allows for the introduction of a greater
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amount of victim impact testimony in order for the gov-
ernment to show the ‘harm’ caused by the crime.”49
Similarly, in the sentencing phase of the Moussaoui
trial, the government put on over three dozen VIE wit-
nesses, including family and friends, police and
firefighters, and ex-mayor Rudolph Giuliani (the govern-
ment’s first VIE witness).50 Given that Moussaoui’s
predicate offense involved the deaths of almost three thou-
sand individuals and injuries to countless more, what
might be called the “McVeigh metric” will very likely be
successfully invoked in any subsequent appeal. Payne’s
authorized “quick glimpse of the life [the defendant] chose
to extinguish,”51 it is fair to say, quite clearly assumes mod-
ified meaning in the context of mass killings, which, if
future acts of terrorism come to pass, the federal courts
will be obliged to elucidate.52
Federal courts, however, have been inclined to gener-
ously admit VIE in more traditional capital trials,
permitting testimony from not just family members, as
provided for in the FDPA,53 but also teachers, neighbors,
school classmates, friends, and coworkers.54 In United
States v. Allen,55 for instance, a capital trial involving the
death of a security guard during a failed armed bank rob-
bery, the government offered eleven VIE witnesses,
including a former coworker, two bank employees, and
the victim’s ex-wife.56 Meanwhile, in United States v. Bar-
nette,57 which involved a prosecution for a double murder,
the government called seven VIE witnesses. Highlighting
further still the mercurial nature of the issue, a federal
court in Massachusetts without elaboration held that the
government could present three or four family members
for each victim in a charged double murder.58
In sum, federal courts evince a distinct reluctance to
limit the number of VIE witnesses and the persons eligible
to provide such information.59 While the Tennessee jury in
Payne itself heard from only the grandmother/mother of
the two victims (with her testimony echoed by the state
prosecutor), federal capital trials today can involve consid-
erably greater numbers of witnesses, without any necessity
of sanguinary connection.60
B. What Qualifies as “Impact”
Likewise, the definitional scope of “impact” has been
noticeably indefinite, with the FDPA again providing only
modest help. By its terms, the FDPA permits VIE that
informs the sentencing authority of “the effect of the
offense on the victim and the victim’s family . . . and the
extent and the scope of the injury and loss suffered by the
victim and the victim’s family, and any other relevant
information.”61 Federal courts, however, have permitted
evidence well beyond the “loss suffered by the victim and
the victim’s family,”62 presumably (yet never expressly)
relying upon the catchall FDPA language “and any other
relevant information.”63 In Moussaoui, for instance, the
government successfully mounted extensive testimony on
the impact on not just family but also friends, coworkers,
rescue personnel, and even New York City’s then mayor,64
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as well as the disruptive impact on New York City65 and
the Pentagon.66 In McVeigh, jurors over the course of two
days’ testimony heard extensive testimony from family
and friends,67 as well as gripping evidence on the emo-
tional harms suffered by professional emergency rescue
workers and police.68
Courts have also been amenable to what might be
called “institutional” VIE. For instance, in United States v.
Battle,69 the government successfully mounted testimony
from three prison guards who testified of the impact the
killing of a fellow guard had on the climate of a federal
prison. In upholding its admission, the Eleventh Circuit
deemed the testimony proper because it 
told the jury that the harm caused by Battle’s killing of
Officer Washington was not simply to take a life, but
also to embolden other prisoners, to increase the
harassment of guards by prisoners, and to increase the
stresses on prison staff (making them feel less safe) in
the peculiar environment of a prison in which many
inmates are already serving life sentences or long sen-
tences.70
More recently, a federal district court in Kansas tacitly
approved of VIE relating to the impact of the murder of a
local sheriff on the county sheriff’s department and the
people of the county, requiring only that the government
provide additional detail in its notice relative to the pro-
posed VIE.71 In a capital espionage case not involving
deaths, the Eastern District of Virginia rejected a vague-
ness challenge to VIE associated with “[t]hreats to
national security.”72 According to the court, such threats
“are not obtuse principles, and the potential victims are
clear.”73
By the same token, federal courts have been disin-
clined to admit VIE concerning victims of any crimes
other than those for which the defendant is being sen-
tenced.74 In United States v. Sampson,75 the District of
Massachusetts expressed concern over the fact that the
FDPA fails to expressly mention such evidence, address-
ing only VIE on the charged “offense,” and that, even if it
did, the additional VIE would “create too great a risk that
the jury would be influenced by sympathy and passion” in
violation of due process.76
Also, in one of the handful of instances in the study
period in which a trial court found fault with VIE, the
Southern District of New York, in addressing pretrial
motions in the capital prosecution of two individuals for
the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
curbed government efforts to bifurcate VIE into fatal and
nonfatal outcomes.77 While otherwise deeming the aggra-
vating factors “grave risk of death to additional persons,”
“multiple killings or attempted killings,” and VIE as dis-
tinct and nonduplicative, the court found that the
proposed aggravator of “serious injury to surviving vic-
tims” was “entirely and wholly subsumed” by the VIE
aggravator.78 While both “function[ed] to provide the jury
with details concerning the widespread human trauma” of
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the bombings, as authorized by Payne,79 the government’s
strategy amounted to an impermissible “attempt to spin
off” aggravators from what “should really only be one.”80
In requiring that the two aggravators be consolidated, the
court added that 
what is most problematic is the fact that, because such
parsing of categories serves no evidentiary purpose (since
such evidence would still be admitted under the aegis of
the umbrella aggravator), the sole motivation for doing so
is to ratchet up the number of aggravating factors and
“give the government free rein to trump whatever miti-
gating factors are raised by the defendant.”81
C. Victim Traits
Relying upon the FDPA’s general allowance for informa-
tion “that identifies the victim of the offense,” federal
courts generously admit VIE relating to the personal traits
of victims. In Jones v. United States,82 the Supreme Court
rejected a claim that victim trait–related VIE was duplica-
tive of “victim vulnerability,” another nonstatutory
aggravating factor noticed by the government. According
to the five-member Jones majority, victim vulnerability and
traits are distinct, with the latter serving to inform the jury
of the “victim’s individual uniqueness.”83 According to the
Court, while the “concepts of victim impact and victim
vulnerability may well be relevant in every murder case,
evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a par-
ticular case are inherently individualized.”84 Similarly,
Jones rebuffed challenges to VIE sounding in vagueness
and overbreadth,85 as have other courts.86
While federal case law lacks the hugely varied instances
of positive victim traits evidenced in state opinions,87 and
“comparative worth” assessments are checked by the
FDPA’s requirement that jurors certify that the back-
grounds of victim and defendant did not influence their
capital decision,88 federal courts are nonetheless predis-
posed to freely admit victim trait evidence. In United States
v. Hall, for instance, the Fifth Circuit condoned admission
of VIE to the effect that the victim was an aspiring doctor.89
In United States v. Fulks,90 the Fourth Circuit upheld admis-
sion of a letter sent by an adult murder victim to her sister,
referring to her determination to recover emotionally from
childhood sexual abuse by her father and to leave an abusive
spouse.91 Meanwhile, in United States v. Bernard,92 the Fifth
Circuit, citing Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Payne
approving of “contextual evidence” relating to victims,93
upheld admission of evidence that the victims were “youth
ministers” who were attending a revival meeting on the day
they were killed.94 Because religion figured centrally in the
victims’ lives, the Bernard court held, “it would be impossi-
ble to describe their ‘uniqueness as individual human
beings’ without reference to their faith.”95
D. Opinion Evidence 
Finally, federal courts have been vigilant in enforcing
Booth’s remaining prohibition of (1) witness characteriza-
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tions of capital defendants and their crimes and (2) wit-
ness opinions of whether death should be imposed.96 In
contrast to the states, where the bans have shown signs of
erosion,97 federal government efforts to admit such testi-
mony has come in for critical scrutiny. In United States v.
Barnard,98 for instance, the jury received written state-
ments from the mother and father of the victim that
provided as follows: 
(Mother): “I’m sorry for you, for your heart to be so
hard, you couldn’t even see the innocence of the two
you’ve killed.”
(Father): “I truly believe that . . . our children were trag-
ically and recklessly stolen from us. There was no
profit to be gained, no angry exchange, it was just a
useless act of violence and total disregard of life.”99
The Fifth Circuit deemed the statements impermissible
(yet harmless) witness characterization testimony.100
While no decisions in the study involved a challenge to
prosecution witness sentence opinions, one rejected an
effort by the defense to avail itself of anti-death sentiments
among victims’ survivors.101 In United States v. Brown,102
the Eleventh Circuit denied a claim that the government
violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose that a vic-
tim’s spouse opposed the death penalty, given that Booth
proscribed admission of such testimony.103
Despite the continued existence of the sentence opin-
ion bar, the Moussaoui trial perhaps signals coming use of
an alternate form of testimony that subtly communicates
opinion testimony—on behalf of the defense. Since Payne,
it has not been uncommon for state courts to uphold
admission of testimony from prosecution witnesses con-
taining thinly veiled pro-death opinions. In one Nevada
capital case, for instance, a surviving spouse urged the
jury to “show no mercy,” which the Nevada Supreme
Court unanimously concluded did not qualify as opinion
but rather amounted to a request that the jury return the
most serious sentence it felt appropriate.104 Similarly, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld admission of the following
statement offered by the wife of a murdered police officer:
My family and I are very confident that all of you will
return a quick verdict which will send a message to my
children, society, and the law enforcement community
that we simply will not tolerate or accept our last
means of protection being annihilated on our streets.
Renew our faith in the criminal justice system and
bring a phase of closure to this ongoing nightmare that
fills our lives.105
In Moussaoui, the defense sought to turn this ambigu-
ity to its own advantage by calling twenty-four survivors of
the 9/11 tragedy.106 Although not allowed to specify
whether they favored death or not, the witnesses spoke of
their recovery since 9/11, used terms such as “compas-
sion” and “respect for life,”107 and testified with limited
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emotion (as compared to the government’s VIE wit-
nesses).108 One survivor, whose son died in the World
Trade Center, calmly spoke of how he had tried to channel
the “mixture of rage, murderous rage, and also deep feel-
ings of sadness” he felt. “I had a choice of staying with
these feelings or sort of nurturing them. I tried to think of
ways that I could learn more. I felt the need for bridges of
understanding with people who could do this kind of
thing.”109 Another survivor, who lost his father in the
World Trade Center attacks, offered that “I saw that if I
had let myself succumb to the fear and anger and
vengeance, then more than the planes would have been
hijacked that day.”110
It remains to be seen whether other federal courts will
be similarly receptive to such testimony111 or, like state
courts, will reject defense efforts to avail themselves of
survivor VIE testimony.112 Either way, it is likely that fed-
eral (and state) courts increasingly will be pressed to
elucidate the bounds of permissible “opinion” VIE.113
III. Conclusion 
As the foregoing makes clear, today federal courts admit
VIE of a quality and degree far in excess of Payne’s envis-
aged “quick glimpse of the life defendant[s] chose to
extinguish.”114 This tendency is most vividly apparent in
capital prosecutions for mass killings, such as McVeigh and
Moussaoui, the tragic scope of which naturally presses the
bounds of both “victim” and “impact.” Yet, as shown above,
with the meager limits imposed by the FDPA and Payne as
a backdrop, federal courts also liberally admit VIE in more
typical capital cases. And, despite notice requirements and
increasing use of preliminary judicial review, the emotion-
ally potent evidence is merely thrown into the decisional
mix for capital jurors,115 without benefit of a pattern jury
instruction in any circuit,116 with the sole constitutional
caveat being that the VIE not be so unduly prejudicial “that
it render[s] the trial fundamentally unfair.”117
In turn, as this study of the case law over the fifteen
years since Payne shows, trial and appellate courts have
been disinclined to find fault with VIE. While in a number
of instances trial courts reined in government efforts to
use VIE, almost always finding fault with procedural
aspects such as notice, to date no federal appellate court
has deemed admitted VIE to be reversible error. It is now
apparent, as Payne would have it, that VIE is “simply
another form or method of informing the sentencing
authority” in federal capital trials.118 Just as death is no
longer seen as quite so “different” a penalty than once pur-
ported for juristic purposes,119 neither is VIE, leading to a
symmetric use of the emotionally potent form of evidence
in capital and noncapital trials alike.120 What this means
for future capital trials in the federal system remains to be
seen.
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concurring).
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